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ABSTRACT 
In order to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, programs have been implemented 
to reduce the creation of greenhouse gasses. In this paper the accounting problems 
associated with emission trading schemes and the current standards developments projects 
have been investigated by means of a literary review. Due to the lack of an accepted 
accounting standard, divergent practices have developed when accounting for the effects of 
emissions trading schemes. Progress is evident in the IASB/F ASB joint emissions trading 
project and the accounting decisions that have been made are based on compromise. In an 
effort to create a standard that will provide industry and financial statement users the 
information they need while remaining true to the existing accounting framework. However, 
this completed standard, regardless of its content, will be the source of conflict when gaining 
international public approval and adoption because of the existing divergent practice and 
potential materiality to large emitters accounts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overwhelming scientific evidence shows anthropogenic climate change is affecting our 
global environment. If greenhouse gas emission levels do not change by the year 2050 
scientific modeling conservatively estimates that the mean global temperature could increase 
2-5°C. This increase would equate to melting of the polar ice caps, rising sea levels, and 
changes in weather patterns including significant droughts and increased extreme weather. 
These changes will significantly hinder the advancement of the human race potentially 
causing upwards of200 million Climate Change Refugees. Global Climate Change (GCC) is 
an issue that requires urgent attention. 
In an effort to reduce the impact of GCC governments and other supranational bodies have 
responded in various ways to develop policies based on mitigation and adaptation. These 
initiatives range from educational programs to increase public awareness of the 
environmental effects of their choices to economic or fiscal responses to encourage 
environmental responsibility. One such economic response has been the creation of 
regulated emissions trading schemes aimed at reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
through the use of cap and trade or baseline and credit programs. These regulated markets 
have created a carbon market, putting a price on the creation of GHGs, creating a financial 
impact on GHG producing organizations that did not exist a just few years ago (Bebbington 
& Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). However, there are divergent accounting practices and no 
definitive guidance from standards setters on how to account for carbon related allowances or 
obligations. 
Some of the questions surrounding accounting practices in relation to the emissions trading 
schemes are the initial recognition of assets related to emissions allowances (either by 
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purchase or allocation), what kind of asset is a emission allowance, and the recognition of 
any liabilities associated with the production of GHGs. 
In the absence of authoritative accounting guidance a diverse range of accounting treatments 
has evolved. This can be seen among the financial statements of companies affected by the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) where 15 different approaches had 
been used to account for the effect of the assets and liabilities associated with GHG 
emissions (lET A 2007). This diversity in accounting practices has lead to companies with 
similar emissions profiles providing different results on their balance sheets. Creating a lack 
of consistency in financial reporting among GHG creating organizations that could 
undermine investor's confidence in a company's strategy in regards to carbon transactions 
(K.PMG, 2008) as it is very difficult to compare business performance when accounting 
treatments are unclear (lET A 2007). In addition, dependent on the accounting practices 
accepted by the GHG producing company significant volatility can exist within its financial 
statements. 
It is clear that a consistent accounting standard is required to present the information related 
to emissions trading schemes in a way that is transparent, valuable and comparable with 
others, while still balancing simplicity, as the impact on operations could be significant. 
(O'Connor 2009, Ngwakwe 2010, Deloitte 2010). 
Many layers of analysis is required to understand GCC and emissions trading fully, this 
paper will concentrate on the financial accounting issues related to emissions trading 
schemes. A detailed analysis of the existing accounting methods, stakeholder opinions and 
academic literature will be undertaken in order to answer the following questions: 
• What are the accounting issues related to emissions trading schemes? 
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• What are the benefits of presenting the net or full position in regards to allocated or 
purchased emissions allowances? 
• What was the reaction to the IASB's Interpretation IFRJC 3 (Emissions Rights), and 
why? 
• What are the prevailing opinions of the stakeholders in how to proceed with 
accounting standards in relation to emissions trading schemes? 
• How is the IASB/F ASB work progressing on a new standard? 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
The earth is warmed and remains inhabitable largely due to heating resulting from the 
"greenhouse effect" a natural process by which a portion of the infrared radiation received by 
earth from the sun is trapped with in the atmosphere. Specific gasses naturally occurring 
with in our atmosphere have the ability to trap this radiation, which would normally be 
reflected back into to space. These gases, the most common of which are carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide and hydroflorocarbons are called greenhouse gasses (GHG's). 
Atmospheric GHG levels are currently at the highest concentration they have been in the past 
600,000 years. Since the pre-industrial era atmospheric levels of C02 have increased from 
280ppm to 380ppm (Stem, 2006). The balance of scientific evidence suggests this increase 
is entirely due to human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and 
changes in land-use (Stem, 2006). This increase in GHG concentrations has been 
scientifically proven to have the net effect of increasing the average global temperature 
(Bebbington & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). Current scientific modeling suggests that a 
doubling of the concentration of GHGs from pre-industrial times will result in a 2-5°C 
increase in the mean temperature of the earth. If emissions continue at their current levels 
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atmospheric GHG concentrations will double their pre-industrial era concentrations by the 
year 2050 (Stem 2006). 
As the world warms the risk of abrupt and large-scale climate change increases (Stern 2006). 
Our climate system is non-linear there is fear that any significant increase in GHG 
concentrations could create a "runaway effect" leading to dangerous climate change 
(Bebbington and Larrinage-Gonzalez 2008). Within the last century the mean temperature of 
the earth has already recorded an increase of 0. rc (Stern 2006). This change is occurring 
at a rate that is unusually rapid by historical standards and will directly affect human welfare 
(Breidenich, Magraw, Rowley, & Rubin 1998). 
The various global impacts of Global Climate Change (GCC) include changes in rainfall 
patterns and increased extreme weather events. Melting of the polar ice caps will cause 
rising sea levels flooding islands, coastlines and other low lying areas, as well as ocean 
acidification. Changes in ocean currents and weather patterns will create significant changes 
in effected areas even potentially causing significant cooling. As the mean temperature of 
the earth warms the range to tropical diseases such as malaria, cholera and dengue fever will 
increase affecting more of the earth's population (Breidenich et al 1998, Stern 2006). 
Climate change will affect the basic elements of life, such as access to water and food 
production for people around the world. As many as 200 million people could be 
permanently displaced due to rising sea levels and permanent drought (Stern 2006). In 
addition with a 2°C increase in global mean temperature 15-40% of the world species face 
extinction (Stern 2006). 
It is estimated that the overall cost of GCC will be at least 5% of the Global GDP but could 
be as high as 20% whereas the cost of action to avoid climate change is estimated at only 1% 
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of the global GDP (Stern 2006). Costs of stabilizing the climate are significant but 
manageable but action must be taken globally. 
An overwhelming body of scientific evidence suggests a discernable human impact on the 
global climate making climate changes a serious and urgent risk, however there is still time 
to avoid the effects of GCC if action is taken now. Therefore several global organizations 
have taken steps to reduce the creation of GHG emissions globally. As early as 1990 the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that it was "certain" that 
"emissions of GHGs resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses carbon dioxide, methane, 
chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxide" and that "these increases will enhance the 
[naturally occurring] greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the 
earths surface" (Breidenich et al 1998). These actions eventually lead to the creation of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Due to overwhelming scientific evidence of anthropological climate change the international 
community recognized the need to create legally binding emissions limits for the six most 
harmful greenhouse gases by the industrialized countries that ratified the treaty (Breidenich 
et al 1998, KPMG 2008). 
The need for the Kyoto protocol's legally binding limits evolved from the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCC C) in 1992. This .was a treaty signed by all developed 
nations committing to a reduction ofGHG emissions to 1990's levels by the year 2000. 
However, it became apparent shortly after its adoption that because it was not legally binding 
and there were no immediate consequences for those who did not meet their targets, the 
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treaty was not implemented by many countries who endorsed its creation (Breidenich et al 
1998). 
The Kyoto Protocol is complex reflecting the complicated existing political, economic, 
scientific and legal issues raised by anthropogenic climate change (Breidenich et al 1998). It 






Commitments to GHG reductions 
Implementation of policies to meet the objectives 
Minimizing the effects on developing countries 
Accounting, Reporting, and Review of emissions 
Compliance 
The Kyoto protocol recognizes a common but differentiated responsibility, with the 
developed countries baring most of the responsibility to reduce GHG emissions. This is 
because developed countries have historically contributed more to the problem, where as 
developing countries generally have a low level of emissions per capita, and in order for their 
continued development their emissions will need to increase. 
Overall the Kyoto protocol requires a lowering of global GHG emissions to an average of 
5.3% below 1990 levels. However, this is based on a sliding scale, taking into account the 
vast differences in the national circumstances particularly natural resources, energy 
production and consumption profiles of the developed nations. For example an 8% decrease 
is required of the European Community (EC) while a 1 0% increase is allowed for Iceland 
and Russia is expected to make no change in their emissions (0% decrease) (Breidenich et al 
1998). 
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The Kyoto protocol defines three mechanisms for decreasing emissions. They are 
International Emissions Trading (lET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI). lET limits emissions through use of cap and trade, baseline and credit, 
and rate based schemes that create a regulated trading environment (KPMG 2008). CDM 
and JI are project-based approaches aimed at reducing the generation of emissions. The 
CDM is based on partnerships with developing countries and generates reductions in GHG 
emissions. This mechanism generates Certified Emissions Reductions (CER's) that can be 
used by developed countries to offset their emissions. Joint implementation, like the CDM, 
is project based but it is meant to generate emission reductions in developed countries taking 
effect in 2008. 
To date only one developed country of note has refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol. It is the 
world's second highest GHG emitter, the United States. 
THE CARBON MARKET 
Emissions Trading Schemes 
In order to meet the reduction of GHG emissions defined by the Kyoto protocol a regulated 
mechanism is the development of emissions trading schemes. To facilitate the successful 
implementation of the emissions trading schemes a government or regulatory body must 
create laws taking the power to emit from the entity and giving it to the government. 
Therefore no longer allowing emitting to be free activity. An arrangement is then determined 
in which participating entities may be required to remit to an administrator a quantity of 
tradable rights that is linked to their direct or indirect effects on the environment (Glowacki 
Law Firm 2010). These schemes create a cost for emitting where one did not previously 
exist. 
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Typically there are two popular approaches when implementing such a scheme, cap and trade 
and baseline and credit. Both are market-based approaches aimed at the reduction of 
emissions. 
Cap and Trade 
In general, in a cap and trade program a central authority issues a defined amount of 
emissions allowances to a participant entity at the beginning of the compliance period. At 
the end of that compliance period the entity must surrender allowances for any GHG's they 
have emitted. If the entity has generated fewer emissions then the allocated allowances the 
additional allowances can be sold on the open market for a profit. Ifthe entity has generated 
more emissions then the allocated allowances they must purchase additional emissions 
allowances. If an entity does not have enough allowances to cover its emissions at the end of 
the compliance period it not only faces hefty penalty but will also be required to produce 
allowances to cover the shortage during the next compliance period. Allowances can be 
bought or sold at any time on the open market, and can also be generated through the other 
Kyoto mechanisms. Over time the total number of allowances granted by the central 
authority will decrease therefore creating an economic incentive to generate fewer emissions. 
Typically the majority of allowances are gained by means of a free allocation from the 
regulating body or through an auctioning process. Auctioning allowances is expected to be a 
more effective way of reducing emissions, as entities would be encouraged to make the 
easiest reductions first. However it is feared that moving to an auction system too quickly 
might be counterproductive causing entities to simply pass the additional costs on to 
consumers rather than implement reduction programs. 
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Some cap and trade programs consider that once the regulatory agency has allocated the 
emissions allowances they are the entities to keep regardless of what happens during the 
compliance period. This would mean that if an entity were to discontinue operations it would 
not be required to return its emissions allowances, allowing for their sale on the open market 
to generate cash. Other schemes have implemented clawback clauses where if operations are 
discontinued during the course of the compliance period the entity is expected to return any 
unused allocated allowances. 
The most notable cap ad trade program in use today is the one implemented by the EU as the 
cornerstone of its climate change policy. The EU ETS has been adopted by all 25 member 
countries and effects approximately 12000 installations covering about 40% of the European 
Unions generated GHG's. 
The EU's cap and trade program is run on a per nation basis and works on allowances 
allocated for free, however it is expected that a gradually increasing proportion of allowances 
will be auctioned starting in phase 3 which will run from 2013-2020. Currently regulations 
on clawbacks vary per country with most European countries selecting not to implement 
clawback clauses, Germany would be one notable exception. 
Baseline and Credit 
Like cap and trade schemes baseline and credit schemes seek to create a cost for the 
generation of emissions. They differ in the implementation of the emissions cap. Baseline 
and credit schemes implement the cap on a per entity basis. Creating a baseline for each 
entity, allowing that entity to emit up to the level of its baseline. If an entity emits less than 
the baseline established by the regulatory agency it receives a credit equal to the difference. 
These credits can be sold or banked for use in future compliance periods. If an entity creates 
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more emissions than what was defined in its baseline, it is required to surrender credits equal 
to the difference shortly after the end of the compliance period. Unlike a cap and trade 
scheme where trading of emissions allowances can take place at any time, in a baseline and 
credit scheme the time between when the credits are issued and the deadline for surrendering 
credits is short therefore the trading window is short. 
All other things being equal a participant in a baseline and credit scheme is in a similar 
position as a participant in a cap and trade scheme in terms of additional costs due to the 
scheme. A weakness of the baseline and credit is that insufficient credits may be traded to 
sustain a market therefore a baseline and credit scheme doesn't have the same market thrust 
as a cap and trade scheme. Limiting the participant's ability to trade allowances for profit. 
Carbon Market Size 
In 2009, the global carbon market grew to $144 billion US up 6% from 2008 despite a 
challenging year due to the global economic crisis (World Bank 201 0). 
The EU emissions trading scheme continues to be the driving force for the carbon market, as 
it is the most inclusive and established scheme existing. In recent years trading volumes have 
increased substantially and there is evidence to suggest that a large number of participants 
actively engage in trading allowances, particularly European utilities (IASB 2009). EU 
allowance transactions reached $118.5 billion US in 2009 meaning the rights to over 6.3 
billion tones of C02 changed hands through spot, futures, and options contracts (World Bank 
2010). Substantial growth was noted in the spot markets during the first half of the 2009, 
proof that EU companies were using emissions allowances to generate cash during the 
economic crisis where additional financing was hard to secure (World Bank 2010). 
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The resulting credit crunch created by the global economic crisis led to a reduction in the 
access to capital and caused project development through the JI and CDM mechanisms to 
sharply decrease due to the inability for many project developers to secure financing (World 
Bank 2010). 
The carbon market is expected to reach into the trillions of dollars in the next decade as more 
emissions trading schemes are brought online (Platt 2009). In 2007 the US emitted 7.14 
billion metric tones ofGHG's. Currently the US market is valued at $100 million US but it 
is projected to grow to over $4 billion US with the senate approval of federal emissions caps 
in late 2009 (Elfrink & Ellison 2009, World Bank 2010). New Zealand has created a 
mandatory cap and trade program as part of its climate change policy and Australia is set to 
follow in the near future, however currently the bill has been tabled until 2013 due to 
governmental issues. In addition Japan, Brazil, Mexico and many other countries are 
seriously considering the development of either mandatory or voluntary emissions trading 
schemes to be implemented in the near future. However, with the Kyoto protocol set to 
expire at the end of 2012 and a lack of progress being made by political powers in the 
creation of a new agreement, these markets need long-term signals from regulators and 
policy makers to aid in their creation. 
Financial Impact 
The financial impact on participant companies is forecasted to be minor. Economic theory 
suggests that businesses participating in an emissions trading schemes will pass on 
opportunity costs to their customers allowing them to make net profits due to the 
combination of increased product prices and free emissions allocations. Empirical studies 
have now been completed using the first two phases of the EU emissions trading scheme 
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(Smale, Hartley, Hepburn, Ward, & Grubb 2006, de Bruyn, Markowska & Nelissen 2010, 
Lund 2007, Kara, Syri, Lehitla, Helynen, Kekkonen, Ruska & Forsstrom 2006). The results 
suggest that not only energy producers but also energy intensive industries had passed 
through the opportunity cost of emissions allowances to their product prices. This pass 
through of the opportunity costs of emissions trading has been well documented in EU 
electricity prices (Kara et al 2006, Bonacina & Gulli 2007). Therefore participating entities 
are facing an increase in cost on two fronts, those directly related to emissions reduction 
schemes as well as indirect costs of comparable magnitude related to higher electricity costs 
(Lund 2007). 
In general, empirical evidence suggests that most participating sectors are expected to have 
profited from the EU's emissions trading schemes with the notable exceptions of the cement 
and steel industries which are most effected (Lund 2007, Smale et al 2006). However it has 
been noted that some electricity intensive industries not regulated by the EU emissions 
trading scheme, such as aluminum and chlorine production, face significant negative affects 
due to increased electricity costs (Lund 2007, Smale et al 2006). 
EMISSIONS ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
With the relative youth and size of the carbon market there are obvious complexities 
associated with accounting for the effects of emissions trading schemes. Unfortunately the 
main features that make these emissions trading schemes attractive to governments are 
precisely the ones that create difficulties for accountants to capture under existing standards. 
The challenges result from a previously costless activity has now become costly, however, 
the government has mitigated the cost by means of marketable allowances (Cook 2009). The 
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accountant's problem is routed in the government's objective to motivate the producers of 
emissions by creating an input cost (Cook 2009) 
Emissions trading schemes create several accounting issues according to Veith, Werner & 
Zimmermann (2009) five are of notable interest: 
• Emission rights before maturity fulfill the definition of assets and can be 
purchased or sold at any time on the active market. 
• Typically, a certain number of certificates are allocated for free while extra 
certificates have to be purchased. 
• Physical emissions give rise to recognizing expenses and liabilities. 
• The liability emerging through annual emission is settled by surrendering the 
respective amount of emission rights (i.e. the liability cannot be settled in cash). 
This is done on 30 April of the subsequent year; that is, for most firms the end of 
their financial year and that of the ETS trading cycle do not coincide. 
• Variation in emission rights prices gives rise to holding (Or trading) gains or 
losses. 
When considering these accounting issues it is important to consider them relative to how the 
allowance was acquired, either by allocation, purchase or Kyoto's CDM. As well as whom it 
was acquired by, either broker or emitter. (Raiborn & Massoud 201 0). This variance in the 
cost and use of emissions allowances is the core issue when defining one uniform accounting 
treatment across the entire emissions trading collective. 
Are Emissions Allowances Assets? 
It is clear that emissions allowances meet both he F ASB and IASB definitions of an asset. 
However emissions allowances do not fit neatly under any existing accounting standard 
because of their so many uses (commodity, currency, or financial instrument), therefore 
causing problems associated with their classification. Arguments exist to classify emissions 
allowances as inventory, intangible assets or financial instruments. 
Inventory assets are typically defined as assets that are either ready for sale in the course of 
ordinary business, in the process of production, or consumed in the process of production. 
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Since emissions allowances have become part of the necessary costs to comply with the 
environmental regulations and emission reductions schemes it can be argued that they are 
consumed in the process of production and therefore an inventory asset. Proponents of this 
theory suggest that emission allowances are a key cost of production and can be viewed the 
same as any other operational input (Raibom & Massoud 2010, Delloitte 2010). 
Intangible assets are defined as an identifiable asset without physical substance. Since 
emissions allowances are without physical substance but still maintain value both in the 
ability to create emissions, but also within the spot carbon market, they more closely meet 
the definition of an intangible asset than that of an inventoried asset. However some of the 
traditional accounting practices associated with intangible assets do not fit with emissions 
allowances due to amortization issues associated with their finite life (Deloitte 201 0). 
Finally financial instruments are defined as a contract that gives rise to a financial asset of 
one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. An emissions 
allowance's lack of substance and ability to be traded on the open market creates another 
albeit less popular argument for the classification of emissions allowances as financial 
instruments (Raibom & Massoud 201 0). A compelling argument for the inclusion of 
emission allowances as financial assets is the fact that carbon brokers participate in the 
carbon market on the short term buying and selling allowances as the spot market price 
fluctuates. 
Currently in industry emissions allowances are widely classified as both inventory and 
intangible assets, with industry regulators accepting either definition. 
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What Is Their Accounting Value? 
Emissions allowances can be acquired in a number of different ways varying from the free or 
low-cost allocation by government agencies to purchase on the open market. Typically only 
small amounts of emissions allowances are purchased or traded, therefore the valuation of the 
granted allowances is debatable. When taking into account the volumes of emissions 
allowances that are allocated over a course of the compliance period differences in valuation 
treatments across entities has the potential to cause significant impact in the financial 
statements. In addition, recognition of assets and liabilities with different valuation bases 
could produce volatility of the financial results of some companies. For these reasons there 
is significant debate over the accounting value of emission allowance allocations. Should 
they be recognized at historical cost or fair value? 
With many regulated entities using both purchased and allocated allowances throughout the 
course of normal production often the allowances obtained by governmental allocation are 
recorded at their historical cost (zero value) and combined with the purchased allowances at 
market value to produce a weighted average cost of allowance during use. This method 
significantly underreports the actual value to the emissions allowances, but given that most 
regulated entities intend to consume the allowances during the course of production within 
the compliance period, from their perspective this issue is considered minor. 
Other stakeholders support a fair value approach to recording the market value of the 
emissions assets regardless of how they are acquired. Application of this method creates a 
more accurate picture of the economic effect of emissions allowances but creates further 
questions in regards to how and when to recognize the value of the allowances that are 
allocated at a cost significantly below their market value. The recognition of this value could 
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be completed by use of a government grant, but this in turn creates more questions regarding 
this timing of the recognition of the grant. Currently under IFRS that government grant 
would be recognized as income inline with the costs it is meant to subsidize, ie the grant is 
recognized as income on a matching basis as costs are accrued by the generation of emissions 
over the compliance period (Elfrink and Ellison 2009). However, an argument could be 
made for the initial recognition of the entire emissions allowance upon receipt, when the 
government can no longer take away the subsidy and it belongs entirely to the entity (Cook 
2009). 
Currently most regulated entities use the historical cost method when valuing their emissions 
allowances. There would be more industry support for the fair value method if the grant 
could be treated the same as liability and revalued continuously to current market prices 
avoiding the generation of some artificial volatility that have caused many critics to voice 
complaints (Cook 2009). 
Are Emissions Liabilities And If So When Should They Be 
Recognized? 
In industries effected by emission trading schemes most entities emit GHG's through the 
normal course of their business. It is clear that as these regulated entities incur an obligation 
to produce emissions allowances for any GHG emissions occurring within the compliance 
period or face severe penalties (Deloitte 2010, Elfrink & Ellison 2009). The questions 
existing are related to how and when should these liabilities be recognized. 
The liability can be recognized based on the amount of physical emissions that have been 
generated within the compliance period to date, or accrued based on an average of the 
expected amount of emissions within the entire compliance period. This liability could be 
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valued based on the weighted average cost of the emissions allowances held by the company 
or this liability could be valued based upon its current market value (Deloitte 201 0). 
In addition, one existing argument suggests valuing the obligation from GHG emissions as 
follows. An obligation for an estimation of any physical emissions above the allocated 
allowances within the compliance period would be estimated and then an equal portion of 
that cost would be accrued during each reporting period. This method involves only 
reporting the net position and holding the allocated allowances either off the balance sheet or 
at zero value (historical cost). 
When Is The Revaluation Of Assets And liabilities Appropriate? 
Revaluation of the assets and liabilities related to emissions is another common accounting 
question in relation to emissions trading schemes. Upon initial receipt should the emissions 
allowances received by allocation be accounted for at their market value or at their cost (nil 
value), or at some combination of the two. The same question can be asked regarding the 
liability that emerges from emitting, should it be valued at the cost of the allowances on hand 
or at the market value of the allowance, or a combination of the two. If the asset for the 
emissions allowance is to be valued at fair value initially when is it appropriate to revalue it 
to the current market value. Typically the liability associated with a market driven 
commodity is revalued to market value at the statement issuing date. Therefore if the 
liability associated with emitting is to be held at market value if the allocated assets are not 
revalued to current market value a significant variation in value of the liability and the value 
of the asset could be recorded when in reality none exists. 
Accounting mismatches with regard to emission rights are typically due to different valuation 
rules for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses and their respective timing (Veith et al 
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201 0). As can be seen above as decisions are made regarding the accounting treatment of 
emissions trading schemes, more detailed questions arise. In addition some decisions create 
unintended mismatches or artificial volatility among the financial statements of effected 
entities. Given the relative youth of emissions trading schemes and their complex effects on 
the regulated entities financial statements it is difficult for standards setters to define the 
accounting treatments and boundaries of emissions trading schemes while still maintaining 
the intent and purity of the existing accounting standards. 
POTENTIAL APPROACHES 
To date there has been two generally accepted approaches to account for and present the 
economic effects of emissions trading schemes. These have been to either report the net 
position or the full position. In the net approach only purchased credits would affect the 
balance sheet, allocated credits are reported at a nil value. In the full approach all emissions 
credits are held at market value on the balance sheet. Any government issued credits would 
be considered a donated asset. In addition the full liability is also carried at market value 
(Bebbington & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). Both approaches are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Net Approach 
The net approach involves recognition and reporting of the net position in regards to 
emission allowances. Maintaining the status quo when dealing with the accounting effects of 
emissions trading schemes by dealing only with the marginal effect on cost. If the entity 
creates no more physical emissions than the amount of allowances issued to them no new 
cost emerges. Therefore when dealing with the net approach the only cost would be 
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acquiring additional allowances in the market and the only credit would be related to the 
proceeds of a sale, netting the benefits of the allowances against the cost of emissions. 
Proponents of this method argue that as long as an entity emitted no more than the amount 
covered by its emissions allowances no new costs arise and to furnish more information 
regarding emissions trading schemes would be to confuse the actual economic picture with 
too much data. They suggest that taking a net approach would smooth the noise within the 
data associated with emissions trading schemes presenting a clearer picture of the economic 
effect of carbon emissions (Veith et al2009). In addition this approach is easier to 
implement than the full approach with less questions surrounding the recognition of assets. 
The weakness associated with the net approach is that it moves significant obligations off the 
balance sheet creating a partial invisibility of the effects of the emissions (Griffin 2010, 
Mackenzie 2009). All allowances, purchased or allocated, have value and could be sold in 
the carbon spot market for cash, as well, all emissions create a liability not just those 
occurring above the entities target level. Therefore, the net approach tends to understate both 
the assets and liabilities associated with GHG emissions. 
Once government issued allowances have been allocated to an entity, in most cases they will 
not be rescinded if the entity was to no longer continue in a business that creates emissions of 
GHG's. In such an event the additional credits could be sold on the carbon spot market for 
cash. Therefore regardless of their origin emissions allowances have an effect on the bottom 
line of the company (Mackenzie 2009). Additionally this approach will breakdown as 
allowance trading begins, when it becomes impossible to determine which allowances were 
part of the government grant and which were gained by purchase on the market (Cook 2009). 
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The net approach effectively disables the market oriented thrust of cap and trade schemes, 
undermining a major desired effect of the creation of a carbon market. That is, to incentivize 
even those companies who have additional emissions allowances to cut their emissions in 
order to generate income by selling allowances (Cook 2009, Mackenzie 2009). To achieve 
this all emissions allowances must be seen to have a monetary value. 
In 2007 approximately 60% of companies used the net approach (lETA 2007) therefore 
incorporation of the carbon price into the markets calculative mechanism in only partial at 
best (Mackenzie 2009). 
In order to show the effects of the net approach the following simplified example has been 
included. This example assumes the following: 
• This entity is an over emitter (Expected emissions > Allocated allowances) 
• 1,000 allowances have been allocated . 
• Entity expects to emit 1400 tonnes of carbon evenly through out the year 
• Additional allowances are purchased twice with in the year 
• Allowance price is constant at 10 € /Tonne of Carbon 
Therefore using the net approach the following assets and liabilities would be captured. This 
represents only the purchased allowances due to their over emitter status. 
Allocation First Half Year End 
Emissions 
Allowance 0 2000 4000 
Assets (€) 
Emissions 
0 -2000 -4000 Liability ( €) 
Table 1: Effects of the Net Approach 
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Full Approach 
This approach accounts for all of the effects of emissions trading schemes by creating an 
asset for all emissions allowances (allocated and purchased) and a liability for all GHG 
emissions. The argument for using the full approach suggests that netting is only appropriate 
when the asset and liability are similar in nature, which is not the case with an inventoried or 
intangible asset, verses the emissions obligation. In addition, the regulator is not a debtor to 
the allowance holder. (Deloitte 201 0) 
However, it is the opinion of some that the full approach is unnecessarily complicated and an 
accurate economic picture can be painted using the net approach. It is felt gross methods are 
too complex and furnish a noisier signal about the effects of emission trading schemes, 
making the net approach the preferred method (Veith et al2010). 
In 2007 only 5% of companies affected by the EU emissions trading scheme used the full 
approach (lETA 2007). 
Regardless of the chosen accounting treatment, the net effect of emissions schemes over two 
years is the same, however, at the end of year one there is significant difference in the 
emissions expenses recorded. Dependant on the company or industry and the choice of 
accounting treatment these differences could prove material to investors. This is especially 
evident in utilities, energy and materials sectors (Griffin 2010). 
Using the same example as above the following entries would be made using the full 
approach. 
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Allocation First Half Year End 
Emissions 
Allowance 10000 12000 14000 
Assets (€) 
Emissions 
0 -7000 -14000 Liability ( €) 
Table 2: Effects of the Full Approach 
EXISTING GUIDANCE 
Existing guidance regarding emissions trading schemes is not very common but does exist in 
the form of the now withdrawn International Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee's (IFRIC) interpretation IFRIC 3 and a guideline from the American Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) that was created in the 1990's as part of a cap and 
trade program implemented in the United states to reduce acid rain. 
IFRIC 3 
In 2004 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRIC 3 (Emissions 
Rights) to provide guidance related to emissions trading schemes. Emissions trading 
schemes were still in their relative youth and there was a lot of disagreement regarding their 
accounting treatment. Emissions trading schemes, though useful from an environmental and 
governmental perspective, created problems from an accounting perspective because they did 
not fit perfectly within the existing principles outlined in the IASB ' s framework. Though it 
was clear that some of the existing standards may need amendments to ensure the meaningful 
accounting of the economic effects of emissions trading schemes, in an effort to provide 
timely guidance to affected entities, the IFRIC committee tried to work within the existing 
framework to provide the necessary guidance. Concluding that the need for timely guidance 
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to prevent divergent practices developing outweighed the disadvantage that the interpretation 
might be amended in the future (IFRIC 3 2004). 
IFRIC set out to provide accounting guidance for an operational cap and trade emissions 
rights trading scheme. According to IFRIC 3 (2004) the issues covered within their scope 
were as follows. 
• Does a cap and trade scheme give rise to (i) a net asset or liability or (ii) an asset 
and a liability, deferred income and/or income? 
• If a separate asset is recognized, What is the nature of the asset recognized if 
necessary 
• If a separate liability, deferred income and or income is recognized, What is the 
nature of that item and how is it measured? 
IFRIC came to the following consensus when considering the above scope. Cap and trade 
does not give rise to a net asset or liability. In this decision IFRIC opted for the full 
approach. It was felt that this was the only appropriate action given the actual value of the 
emissions allowances and obligations. It was felt that netting was only appropriate when the 
asset and liability were similar in nature and that emissions allowances/obligations did not 
meet that hurdle, given that the allowances could be used to settle the emissions liability or 
sold on the carbon spot market for cash. Therefore the emissions regulator was not a direct 
debtor of the emissions allowance and netting was not appropriate. 
Secondly, it was decided that allowances were intangible assets, to be accounted for by lAS 
38 (Intangible Assets), and to be measured at fair value even if they are issued for less. 
Significant consideration was given to whether or not the emissions allowances could be 
considered a financial instrument, but it was decided that they did not meet the stringent 
definition of a financial instrument nor did they fall into the limit class of other assets that 
could be measured like financial assets recording their fair value at each reporting date with 
the gains/losses showing in profit or loss (Cook 2009). IFRIC acknowledged that emissions 
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allowances have some features more commonly found in financial assets than intangible 
assets but concluded that it would be inappropriate to ask the board for an amendment of the 
scope ofiAS 38 and 39 (Financial Instruments). As intangible assets the allowances can be 
revalued but this change is shown outside of profit/loss. 
The difference between the amount paid for the allowances and their fair value was to be 
considered a government grant in accordance with IAS 20 (Government Grants). The grant 
was to be initially recognized as deferred income in the balance sheet and then income on a 
systematic basis over the compliance period regardless of if the allowances are held or sold. 
At the time ofiFRIC 3 's release a change to IAS 20 was expected that would allow for the 
recognition of the entire value of the allocated allowances as cash upon receipt. 
IFRIC decided that the emissions allowances should not be amortized but tested for 
impairment as defined in IAS 36 (Impairment of Assets). Again there was some 
disagreement about this decision amongst the accounting community. Some felt that an 
allowance represents a right to produce emissions and therefore allowances should be 
amortized to reflect the consumption of these rights. IFRIC disagreed stating that a 
participant does not consume the economic benefits of an allowance as a result of its 
emissions but realizes the benefits of that allowance by surrendering it to settle an obligation. 
It was determined, that as emissions are released a liability should be recognized for the 
obligation to deliver allowances covering the emissions produced. This liability is a 
provision, under IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets) at the 
best estimate of the expenditure required to cover the present obligation as of the balance 
sheet date at fair value, with changes in value, shown in profit and loss. There was some 
argument by the accounting community that the "best estimate" of the liability could the cost 
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of the allowances to the entity however it was noted by IFRIC that the liability is to be 
measured independently of how it is to be funded. 
Finally if a reduction in cash flows is generated by specific assets due to the emissions 
scheme the asset may be impaired using lAS 3 (Consolidated Financial Statements). These 
decisions created no symmetry between the revaluation of the liability in the income 
statement and the asset in the balance sheet. 
IFRIC's decisions were based upon existing sound accounting practice but had some 
unintended effects; as such IFRIC 3 was largely disliked amongst the accounting community. 
Most organizations were already using the net approach and did not like the added 
complexity or additional assets shown when using the full approach. Many respondents to 
IFRIC 3 's initial comment period suggested the net approach arguing that an entity should 
only recognize a liability when it holds insufficient allowances to cover its emissions or an 
asset when it holds excess allowances. They argued that accounting this way highlighted the 
entities emitting more than their granted allowances more so than using the full approach. 
IFRIC rejected these arguments stating several reasons, the most significant of which were 
that the allowance and obligation exist independently of each other and that cap and trade 
does not merely represent a tax on excess emissions, it is based upon creating a market for 
emissions. Therefore all allowances can be traded, bought or sold, and allowances that are 
purchased are indistinguishable from those issued to the entity by the government. 
Many respondents during IFRIC 3's comment period were troubled by the mismatch that 
would occur in profit and loss if the allowances were accounted for using the cost model in 
lAS 38, given that the liability for the obligation related to emissions was to be measured at 
current value (lAS 37). These respondents argued that even if allowances were measured at 
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fair value using the revaluation model in lAS 38 there would still be a mismatch in the 
recognition of these changes. Due to the fact that the changes in value ofthe emissions 
allowances would be recognized in equity where as the changes in value of the emissions 
liability would be recognized in profit or loss. IFRIC acknowledged this mismatch but 
suggested that the revaluation method would minimize its effect. This conclusion was very 
much the undoing of the fledgling standard. 
The issuance ofiFRIC 3 resulted in a public outcry. Effected companies complained that 
the application of the interpretation would force them into showing a completely distorted 
picture of their performance in their annual and interim financial statements. The European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) presented a negative endorsement ofiFRIC 3 
stating the following reasons: 
• The assets and liabilities associated with allowances and emissions had different 
valuation bases 
• Revaluations of the allowances as intangible assets were recognized in equity while 
the changes in the liability were recognized in the income statement. 
• There was a possibility of improper matching if liabilities were settled after they 
compliance period had ended. 
In the face of considerable pressure from the business community and European politicians 
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn in June of 2005. IFRIC accepted that though they had made an 
acceptable interpretation using the current framework the end result was confusing. 
Many of the reasons for the disquiet of IFRIC 3 were rooted in the definition of emissions 
trading scheme policy, as stated succinctly by Cook (2009), 
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"[The] government is giving at the start of the year what it will in all probability 
take away at the end Managers resent recognizing a profit early in their reporting 
period on an asset that will have to be surrendered at the end of the period in 
settlement of a liability that the asset was designed to meet" 
The question remains as to what could have been done to prevent the artificial volatility that 
caused such and uproar, while working within the existing framework. Revaluing the grant 
of allowances in the same way as the emerging liability would remove the artificial volatility, 
satisfying the critics. However, within the existing framework there is no principle to 
support such a treatment. As the IASB explores this issue further it will be interesting to see 
which solution they pursue. 
FERC 
The other remaining guidance used by accountants when trying to account for the effects of 
an emissions trading scheme is that issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's 
(FERC) in the United States. The FERC guideline is a legacy accounting standard created 
by the clean air act amendments of 1990. This guidance was issued in response to a cap and 
trade program created in the United States to reduce S02 and therefore acid rain. 
The FERC guidance suggests accounting for allowances other than those that are held for 
speculative purposes at cost. Therefore any granted allowances are held at nil value and an 
asset is only recorded for any purchased allowances. Allowances are considered to be a cost 
of doing business and therefore they are considered to be an inventory asset that is consumed 
during the production process. 
A liability is considered to exist after the entity has emitted and is only recognized if the 
actual emissions exceed the amount of allowances held by the entity in a period. This 
liability is recognized at the cost acquiring the additional allowances necessary to offset the 
excess emissions. If an entity acquires allowances at different times and different costs 
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amortization is calculated by weighted average cost. This provision is notre-measured if the 
market price of the allowance changes, as the difference between actual cost and estimated 
cost is recognized in the period when allowances are purchased. 
The FERC guidance only reports the net effect of an emissions trading scheme therefore 
allowances that are allocated for free are not reflected in the financial statements. It is 
considered that there is only an economic impact on the entity if additional credits are 
bought. 
CURRENT INDUSTRY METHODS 
It is clear from a number of studies (lETA 2007, Lovell, Sales de Aguiar, Bebbington, & 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2011) that there is divergence in accounting standards used in entities 
effected by emissions trading schemes. 
This is characterized in Lovell et al (20 11) a study of the emissions accounting practices of 
the largest emitters within the EU emissions trading scheme. To complete their work the 
financial statements of those responsible for 26% of the verified 2008 emissions were 
studied, then follow up interviews were conducted with the accounting personnel. Their 
findings proved what had been long suspected within the accounting community that the 
large emitters are using a variety of different accounting practices in relation to emissions 
allowance and that there is no uniformity of treatment. 
According Lovell et al (20 11) 42% of companies treat allowances as intangible assets, 31% 
of companies accounted for allocated allowances at nil value where as 15% accounted for 
them at fair value. 58% of companies measured their obligation to surrender allowances 
based on the carrying value of the allowance already granted or purchased and at market 
value of the allowances that still need to be purchased. Consistently there was no disclosure 
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on amortization/depreciation, revaluation, or the use of credits from other Kyoto 
mechanisms. 
According to research conducted by lETA (2007) and Starbatty (2010) there is evidence to 
suggest that despite finding 15 variations of accounting approaches used by entities in the EU 
emissions trading scheme, among the EU's largest emitters there are 3 main approaches. 
The first approach and the least popular is that suggested in IFRIC 3. The second approach 
recognizes the allocated allowance at fair value and the difference between the cost of the 
allowances and their fair value as a government grant but differs from IFRIC3 in the 
treatment of the emissions liability which is measured based upon the carrying value of the 
allowances to be used to cover actual emissions at each period end. Approach 3 is by far the 
most popular and shows only the net position. Allocated allowances are recognized at cost 
(nil value) and are subsequently measured at cost. The liability is recognized as emissions 
are produced but often not shown on the statement of financial position until the emissions 
produced exceed the allocated allowances. The liability is measured based on the carrying 
value of the allowances on hand at each period end that are to be used to cover actual 
emissions on a FIFO or weighted average basis, plus the market value of any allowances at 
each period that would be required to cover any emissions in excess of the already purchased 
allowances. 
With the lack of international regulations some European counties have issued national 
regulations, for example Spain has created a national standard that requires Spanish 
companies effected by the EU emissions trading scheme to follow an accounting practice 
similar to the second approach described above. 
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With no generally accepted standards in existence companies are free to choose the 
accounting method that suits their needs as long as their auditor accepts it. Therefore in 
general many entities affected by emissions trading schemes are turning to their auditors for 
advice on appropriate accounting treatments and in response auditors have been creating best 
practice advice (Lovell et al 201 0). 
With the multitude of ways that emissions allowances can be used, from production to 
trading in order to regulate cash flow, auditors have started recommending the use of an 
activity based model of accounting for the effects of emissions trading schemes. This 
method suggests that accountants follow different accounting principles based on the 
dominant activity of their organization (emitter, creator of green energy, trader or investor). 
However, it is unlikely that standard setters in the IASB would accept this method, given its 
principles based approach to standards setting. It is likely that the IASB would object to an 
activity based approach because though emissions allowances can be used in different ways 
they are still the same object therefore standards setters would likely feel that they should be 
treated in a single uniform way when accounting for their effects. 
As can be seen from the significant variance of even the most popular accounting methods 
there is a need for the standardization of the accounting methods related to emissions trading 
schemes. Even though there is increasing pressure from the international community for a 
single international emissions trading accounting standard, as these standard setting projects 
continue to strive for uniformity there may be problems gaining support when organizations 
are already comfortable in the use of their chosen accounting method. 
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CURRENT STANDARD SETTING PROJECTS IASB/FASB 
With interest in emissions trading schemes increasing globally the IASB received requests 
from several national standards setters, including the F ASB to add a project to its agenda for 
the development of a framework for the financial accounting related to emissions trading 
schemes. 
Though the IASB had limited resources and was overwhelmed its existing projects, they 
acknowledged that the use of emissions trading schemes was increasing and divergent 
accounting practices were emerging. Trading volumes of allowances governed by the EU 
scheme were growing rapidly and there was increasing evidence that a large number of 
participants were actively engaged in trading allowances, particularly European utility 
companies (Starbatty 2010). In addition the FASB had initiated their work on emissions 
trading schemes and there would be a missed opportunity to standardize if the IASB did not 
initiate a project as well. Therefore a joint IASB/F ASB project was initiated, in December 
2007, to develop comprehensive guidance on the financial accounting of emissions trading 
schemes. 
In this project the IASB and F ASB seek to tackle a broad scope and produce a standard 
suitable for all tradable emissions rights and obligations under any emissions trading scheme. 
In the development of this project there are not very many key issues however the ones that 
do exist are very difficult to resolve. Moreover, these issues cannot be addressed in isolation, 
as decisions on one issue will have implications on another, therefore it is necessary to 
investigate thoroughly the financial reporting effects of alternative methods. 
The main issues to be tackled within the current project relate to the recognition and 
measurement of the assets and liabilities in an emission trading scheme and the recognition 
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of assets and liabilities when allowances are given for no monetary value. As stated on the 
IASB's emissions trading scheme project website. 
The objective [of the project} is to provide comprehensive guidance on the accounting for 
emissions trading schemes. In developing this guidance the following issues are to be 
addressed: 
1) Are emissions allowances assets? 
a) Is this conclusion affected by how the allowance is acquired? 
b) What is the nature of the allowance (eg license to emit or form of emission 
currency)? 
c) If allowances are assets, should they be recognized and, if so, how should they be 
measured initially? 
2) Are baselines or the credits assets? 
a) If so, what is the nature of the asset represented by the baseline and should it be 
recognized? 
b) Also how should the baseline be measured initially? 
3) Does the entity that receives allowances or a baseline from the scheme administrator 
have a liability? 
a) If so, what is the nature of the liability and how should it be measured both 
initially and subsequently? 
4) How should allowances and baselines (if necessary) be accounted for subsequently? 
a) Is the existing model in !AS 38 Intangible Assets or !AS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement appropriate? 
b) If not, what is the appropriate accounting? 
5) When should an entity recognize its obligations in emissions trading schemes and 
how should they be measured? 
a) How does !AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets apply? 
6) What are the overall financial reporting effects of the above decisions? 
In the completion of this project it has been mandated that while the framework is still 
relevant the project team should not to be bound to existing IFRS standards in the 
contemplation of the previous questions. 
As work on the project progresses, several tentative decisions have been made by both the 
IASB and the F ASB. In response to questions 1 and 2 both the IASB and F ASB boards have 
decided that emissions allowances or credits are assets in either a cap and trade scheme or a 
baseline and credit scheme. These allowances are to be recognized as an asset even if they 
are acquired for less than market value through a government allocation. Regardless of the 
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cost to acquire these allowances they should be initially and subsequently measured at fair 
value. The argument for these decisions is that the tradable offsets can be seen as a non-
reciprocal transaction, causing the asset received to be measured at fair value. The IASB 
staffs research indicated that financial statement users would prefer this method. 
A much more contentious issue was that of accounting for the credit if issued offsets are 
initially measured at fair value. Three models were presented to the board for discussion, 
the non-reciprocal transfer modes, the performance obligation model, and the compensation 
model. 
The non-reciprocal transfer model suggests that no obligation is incurred upon receipt of the 
offsets therefore an obligation is recognized as the emissions occur. This model is built 
around the premise that the allocated allowances do not create a present obligation before the 
entity creates emissions. 
The performance obligation model suggests the premise that when an entity is allocated 
allowances it has a performance obligation it must fulfill before it can realize income from 
the allowances. This would be characterized by suggesting that at the time of the initial 
allocation of the allowance the entity enters into an agreement with the scheme administrator 
to reduce its emissions below the level represented by the allocation of allowances. 
Suggesting that only if the entity reduces its emissions to nil in a compliance period will it 
retain the number of tradable allowances it has been issued. The performance obligation 
would be measured at the initial carrying value of the allocated allowances. Income would 
be recognized only when there is reliable measurement of an increase in future economic 
benefits related to an increase in an asset or decrease in a liability. 
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The compensation model suggests that the allocation of tradable allowances is not considered 
a non-reciprocal transfer from the scheme administrator to an entity. It considers the 
allocation of tradable offsets in the context of the whole package of requirements imposed by 
emissions trading schemes. A linkage is assumed to exist between the allocation of tradable 
allowances and an adverse change in value of the companies' related assets. This is because 
it is assumed that future compliance costs will have a negative effect on the entity's regulated 
operations and the allowances are issued to mitigate this effect. Therefore in most cases the 
asset existing from the allocation of allowances would be linked to a liability for the adverse 
effect on the companies' assets due to the scheme. This method eliminates the need for an 
entity to accrue a large asset at the beginning of the year, increasing comparability across 
affected entities. It can also eliminate the mismatches that exist when the asset is at fair 
value and the operating liability is accrued at cost. 
After much debate amongst the IASB and F ASB boards made a tentative decision to use the 
performance obligation model was made. In the IASB' s words it was decided that: 
"[An] Entity incurs an obligation to reduce its emissions below the level represented by those 
allowances (cap) only if the entity fulfills this obligation it will be entitled to retain some of 
the allowances." 
This decision was not unanimous; there were board members that felt that the non-reciprocal 
transfer model was more consistent with the framework. However the performance 
obligation model does not result in a gain upon the initial recognition of the allocated 
allowances and the majority of board members and constituents believed that this method 
provided users with financial information that is represented faithfully. Since emissions 
trading schemes rarely make affected entities better off, the initial recognition of allocated 
allowances would not reflect economic reality. The performance obligation model has less 
effect on accounting for future installments and timing of recognition, as well it does not 
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affect statement of income therefore increasing comparability with other entities in the same 
scheme and ones operating in other schemes. It is the feeling of many of the IASB's and 
F ASB' s constituents, especially users that this is the preferred method. 
Currently the boards are discussing the recognition of a liability for emissions in excess of 
initial allocation of emissions allowances. The boards are undecided between recognizing 
the excess emissions liability throughout the compliance period as the entity emits and 
recognizing the excess emissions liability only when the entities emissions have exceeded 
their initial liability for the allocation. Both the F ASB and IASB boards have asked their 
project teams to seek out stakeholder opinions on these issues in the first half of 2011. The 
board is also looking for stakeholder opinions on two possible models for measuring the 
quantity of allowances to be submitted at the end of the compliance period, the expected 
return model or the de-recognition model. In the expected return model the entity is expected 
to initially estimate the number of allowances that will need to be returned based upon 
expectations, whereas, in the de-recognition model the initial estimate of the number of 
allowances that are to be returned is the total number of allowances allocated and a 
subsequent de-recognition takes place if the entity exceeds that specified threshold. 
Both boards have also made tentative decisions regarding the statement of financial position. 
The IASB preferred a gross position to be stated but has tentatively agreed to a linked 
presentation. The linked presentation would present all of the assets and liabilities associated 
with emissions trading schemes in gross amounts but would allow them to be presented 
together and totaled to reveal the net position in terms of the economic effect of emitting. 
Modest progress has been made in the development of this emissions trading standard. 
However, it is clear that there is tension emanating from a fundamental divide in 
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organizational cultures existing in the IASB and F ASB. Typically the IASB prefers a 
principles-based approach where as the F ASB tends to default to a rule based approach. This 
difference appears to be hampering decision making in the project (Lovell et al 2011). 
Currently an exposure draft is expected in the 41h quarter of 2011 however it appears that few 
industry accountants are following the progress of this project (Lovell et al 2011 ). It is 
possible that when the exposure draft is issued there may be some problems obtaining 
support for their proposals or even sufficient feedback and industry response to the draft. 
Since emissions allowances may already be significant to large European emitters financial 
accounts and will only become more significant in the future, industry support to any draft is 
important. 
Expectations of the joint IASB/F ASB emissions trading schemes projects are high with 
institutes, accounting firms, regulators and investors waiting for the completion of an 
accounting standard that will allow for the comparable reporting of sustainability information 
(Singh 2010). 
STAKEHOLDER OPINIONS 
With so many stakeholders affected by emissions trading schemes it is no wonder that there 
are so many different opinions as to the proper way to proceed in order to accurately capture 
the financial effects of emissions trading schemes. Diversity in accounting practices has 
already developed making it a challenge to ensure that everyone is in agreement as to how to 
standardize given that some entities will have to change their chosen approach. In this 
section the opinions of some of the major stakeholders of emissions trading schemes 
accounting are discussed. 
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Environmentalists 
Environmentalists were the first group to acknowledge the occurrence of GCC and its 
potential effects to the human race. This group through scientific research and activism 
managed to bring GCC and its effects to the attention of policy makers and the general 
public. Their concern and activism ensures that they will remain a key stakeholder in any 
issue related to climate change, as they remain committed to ensuring that the 
implementation of any change required to mitigate the effects of GCC will be completed in 
such a way that success is ensured. 
Practicing the net approach removes significant assets and liabilities related to climate 
change from the balance sheet. Though it can be argued that the end effect of emissions 
trading schemes is the same, using the full approach will show all of the effects of climate 
change on an effected entities balance sheet. The environmentalists goal is to ensure that 
effects of climate change are mitigated and as such they are looking to ensure that 
implemented emissions trading schemes are structured in such a way that they will succeed. 
One of the major benefits of a cap and trade scheme is the creation of an active market that 
will encourage affected entities to make emissions reductions to reap the financial benefits of 
trading emissions allowances. Practicing the net approach impairs this market development 
by removing these potential trading assets from the balance sheet and therefore is not favored 
by environmentalists. 
In addition, the inclusion of emissions allowances as an inventoried asset suggests that 
polluting is a necessary business cost, suggesting that polluting is as necessary to production 
as direct material or labor, as statement that does not agree with environmentalists (Raibom 
& Massoud 2010). 
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Standards Setters 
Accounting standards setters are largely in disagreement amongst themselves as to the proper 
way to proceed in the creation of an emissions trading scheme accounting standard. The 
IASB and FASB is under extreme pressure from politicians, industry, and regulators to 
develop a standard that will put an end to the divergent practices existing amongst participant 
entities, while ensuring that the financial statements accurately portray the effects of the 
emissions trading schemes. 
Individuals on the standards setting boards have differing opinions on the proper way to 
proceed to produce the most relevant and accepted accounting treatment. There are those 
that feel that the accounting answers that remain true to the existing IFRS framework 
answers are similar to what published in IFRIC 3. However since those answers are going to 
be unpopular the IASB board is trying to find a way to "sugar coat" their decisions in such a 
way that they will gain support from the other stakeholders. 
While individuals on boards of both the IASB and F ASB have different opinions as to how to 
proceed there is also a fundamental divide in organizational cultures and practices between 
the two groups. The IASB tends to prefer principles based methods where as the F ASB 
prefers rules based approaches. This divide leads to some disagreement between the two 
organizations when trying to create a harmonious standard. The F ASB is likely to consider 
the scheme as a whole, potentially leaning towards the net approach, where as the IASB is 
unlikely to ever accept the presentation of the net effect as it does not fit with in the 
principles existing with in the framework. Both boards have put these issues aside in an 
effort to work together to create a harmonious standard acceptable within the principles 
existing in both accounting organizations, however progress is slow going. 
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Regulators 
Regulators will currently accept any reasonable treatment of the financial effects of 
emissions trading schemes, however regulators, especially European ones are pressuring the 
IASB to develop a standard or they will be forced to develop their own on a per nation basis. 
With the long delay from the inception of the EU emissions trading scheme until the present, 
some countries have already developed their own accounting standards. For example Spain 
has issued a national standard and other nations may be forced to follow suit in the near 
future. 
Politicians have largely not been involved in the debate regarding potential emissions trading 
scheme accounting standards. However with the issuance of IFRIC 3 many European 
politicians voiced their disapproval of the chosen accounting model largely due to the 
industry unhappiness of the potential volatility in the financial statements. These politicians 
exerted enough pressure on the IASB board to facilitate the withdrawal ofiFRIC 3. 
Therefore, their presence and opinion cannot be discounted in the future. 
Academia 
With some notable exceptions those in academic circles, completing research on the 
accounting effects of emissions trading schemes, tend to lean toward the more pure 
implementation of cap and trade programs. Therefore they generally point towards the 
solutions that tend to fit the IASB's framework more aptly. 
Therefore many academics lean toward using the full approach to ensure the entire economic 
picture of the emissions trading schemes is presented. They feel that the presentation of the 
net approach in relation to cap and trade schemes hinders many of the market-based 
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mechanisms that make cap and trade schemes a prevalent choice in the adoption of a 
program aimed at reducing the GHG emissions. 
Industry 
As has been discussed previously in this paper there is a large diversity of chosen accounting 
treatments among the entities affected by emissions trading schemes. According to a study 
completed by lET A (2007) there was up to 15 different methods used by entities affected by 
the EU Emissions trading scheme, however most chosen treatments used by the largest 
emitters could be summarized in 3 methods. 
Amongst the largest emitting participants of the EU emissions trading scheme use of the net 
approach is prevalent. Often this approach is chosen because it is the easiest model to 
implement while having the least impact on the affected entities balance sheet. Accounting 
for the allocated allowances at their cost (nil value) is considered beneficial as most 
managers of companies participating in an emission trading schemes do not want to 
recognize assets on their balance sheet that they will in all likelihood have to forfeit at the 
end of the compliance period to cover their emissions obligation. 
Large European emitters appear uninterested in the development of an IFRS standard to 
cover the effects of emissions trading schemes as they have in many cases already chosen 
and implemented an accounting model to record the effects of the EU emissions trading 
scheme and are uninterested in having to change it. In the majority of cases their approach is 
to account for the net effects of the emissions trading schemes and the large European 
emitters believe, probably correctly, that the IASB is unlikely to accept such an approach in 
their standard development. 
The opinions of many of the stakeholders can be summarized in the table below: 
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Stakeholder Net/Full Kind of Asset? Liability 
Environmentalist Full Intangible 
Shown in full as emissions 
occur 
Standards Setter Full Intangible Shown as emissions occur 
Regulator Undecided Undecided Undecided 
Academia Full Intangible Shown as emissions occur 
Only show estimated 
Industry Net Inventory emissions over allocated 
allowance 
Table 3: Stakeholder Preferences 
DISCUSSION OF CURRENT AND FUTURE EMISSIONS 
PROJECT DECISIONS 
The joint F ASB/IASB project committee has made modest progress in the development of an 
emissions trading standard. The joint boards have made tentative decisions that allow their 
project staff to create a discussion paper in order to seek out stakeholder opinions in the first 
half of 20 ll before work can continue in the second half of 20 ll on the completion of an 
exposure draft (IASB Progress Report Nov 2010). 
Tentative decisions have been made to define allowances in a cap and trade or baseline credit 
schemes are assets regardless of how or why they are acquired. It has been tentatively 
decided that the allocation of allowances creates an obligating event that meets the definition 
of a liability and should be recorded as such on the financial statements. These assets and 
liabilities should be recorded initially and subsequently at fair value. These decisions make 
for a good compromise between what the existing accounting framework requires and what 
affected entities want. The allocated allowances are shown on the balance sheet at fair value 
therefore ensuring that the entire economic effect is shown and the market mechanisms of 
cap and trade are not disabled however an liability for the entire allowance allocation is also 
recognized upon receipt ensuring that managers do not have to recognize large assets that 
will in all likelihood have to be surrendered at the end of the compliance period. 
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It has not yet been decided how the quantity of allowances that is to be retwned after 
compliance period ends will be determined. The existing options for the determination of 
this number is as follows. If an entity expects to emit more than it's allocated allowances a 
liability can be recognized either, as the entity emits throughout the compliance period 
through use of a pro-rata calculation taking into account the allocated allowances and an 
entities actual emissions, or when the actual emissions exceed the allocated allowances. The 
project team is currently seeking stakeholder's opinions on the proper way to proceed on this 
issue. Though no decisions has been made by either board regarding this issue it is this 
authors opinion that a liability should be recognized for the excess emissions throughout the 
compliance period as the entity emits. It would be misleading to wait until the actual 
allocations are exceeded to recognize the additional liability. Since the entity operates 
throughout the compliance period it should recognize the expense of its operations 
(emissions) through out the period, if it expects to emit over its allocation. Waiting until the 
emissions allocation is actually exceeded before recording a liability neither faithfully states 
the actual liability nor does it provide the financial statement users the information they need. 
Some potential downfalls to this method would be related to changes that may become 
necessary due to recording liabilities based on an expectation that may change over time. If 
this view is adopted it would make sense to determine the quantity of allocated allowances to 
be returned using the expected return approach. 
Both the members of the boards and project staff are split on this issue. Arguments can be 
made for either method using the existing frameworks and literature. The future decisions on 
this issue made by the boards will depend largely on what is preferred by the stakeholders. 
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A tentative decision has been made to present the financial data regarding the emissions 
trading schemes in a linked presentation. This presentation style represents another good 
compromise between proponents of the net and full approaches. Showing all of the assets 
and liabilities related to the emissions trading scheme but allowing them to shown together 
and totaled immediately below to reveal the net position. This should again provide 
financial statement users the information they need, while not removing the significant assets 
from the balance sheets or hindering market mechanisms. 
One issue that has not been discussed yet is the definition of what kind of assets emissions 
allowances are. Emissions allowances do not fit neatly under any existing accounting 
standards due to their many uses (commodity, currency, financial instrument). This has 
made their classification difficult in the past due to the fact that they did not fit into any one 
asset definition. Project staff have been given the guidance that though the end result must 
be consistent with the principles defined in the framework they are not limited to using 
existing accounting literature. Therefore they are not required to define the emissions 
allowance in terms of an exiting category of asset and it is this author's opinion that steps 
will be taken to recognize an emissions allowance in its own category of asset. 
When the remaining decisions are made by the IASB and F ASB boards during the second 
half of2011 the project team will have enough information to produce an exposure draft in 
relation to emissions trading schemes and issue it for comments by those interested parities. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that anthropogenic climate change has effected our global environment. The 
policies created to mitigate the effects of this climate change are often market-based 
emissions trading schemes that are meant to reduce the generation of GHG' s. However the 
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features that make these trading schemes attractive to governments are precisely the features 
that make it difficult for accountants to capture under existing accounting guidance. This is 
because climate change legislation has made the previously costless activity of emitting 
GHGs costly, however the government has mitigated the cost by means of allocating 
marketable allowances. 
The EU emissions trading scheme is in its second phase and for the large emitters emissions 
allowances may already be material to their accounts. As the EU emissions trading scheme 
enters its third phase there will be a shift to auctioning emissions increasing the significance 
of the financial impact on an entity. With the lack of an international standard providing 
guidance for the accounting treatment of emissions allowances divergent practice has 
developed amongst those affected by these schemes. 
Studies have shown that upwards of 15 different practices exist amongst those entities 
affected by the EU emissions trading scheme though the largest emitters typically use one of 
three methods. Standardization of accounting practices is necessary to create a level playing 
field and allow for the fair and transparent comparison of the financial statements of those 
entities participating in emissions trading schemes. 
Existing accounting problems associated with emissions trading schemes are related to asset 
classification. Emissions allowances do not fit neatly under any existing accounting standard 
because of their so many uses (commodity, currency, and financial instrument). Therefore 
divergent behavior has developed in the classification and recognition of emissions 
allowances as assets as well as the recognition and valuing of the liability associated with the 
creation of emissions themselves. Currently participant companies account for emissions 
allowances at cost, fair value or some combination of the two. 
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One of the central arguments related to emissions trading schemes is the debate regarding 
accounting for the effects of the scheme by using the net or the full approach. The net 
approach is favored by industry due to its simplicity of implementation and the fact that it 
doesn't require the holding of significant assets in their accounts that will in all likelihood be 
returned at the end of the compliance period. Standard setters and academics favor the full 
approach as it is the most congruent with the accounting frameworks and fully implements 
the market-based thrust of the cap and trade programs. 
Previous guidance in regards to emissions trading exists in the form of the now withdrawn 
IFRIC 3 interpretation. IFRIC 3 advocated for using the full approach and specified that 
emissions allowances were intangible assets to be initially recognized at fair value. The 
difference between what the allowances cost, typically nothing, and market value was to be 
recognized as a government grant. The liability associated with the emissions of GHG's was 
recognized as emissions occurred at market value. Though the IFRIC committee made a 
reasonable interpretation based on sound accounting theory, it was largely disliked by the 
accounting community because of volatility that existed due to different valuation bases for 
the assets and liabilities associated with the emissions trading scheme. Due to intense 
industry and political pressure IFRIC 3 was withdrawn just 6 months after it was issued. 
The other piece of existing accounting guidance is a legacy standard developed by FERC for 
an acid rain cap and trade program. The FERC guidance reported the net position and defined 
emissions allowances to be an inventoried asset to be held at cost. 
Currently industry stakeholders prefer to present the net position when accounting for the 
effects of emissions trading schemes, often holding the emissions allowances at cost and the 
emissions liabilities at the weighted average cost of the allowances. Standards setters, 
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academics and environmentalists prefer accounting treatments that allow for the full 
implementation of the market-based mechanisms of cap and trade schemes. 
In December 2007 the IASB and F ASB initiated a project to develop comprehensive 
guidance for those participating in emissions trading schemes. Though thus far only tentative 
decisions have been made it appears that these decisions are based on compromise, in order 
to find an accounting treatment that will remain consistent with the IASB's framework but 
also provide affected entities with the information they need. The IASB must be careful in 
this process to not look for the quick fix but rely on their principles to solve these difficult 
problems. 
Thus far the joint IASB/F ASB emissions trading scheme project has defined emissions 
allowances as assets to be recognized initially and subsequently at fair value. Tentatively it 
has been decided that a liability to return the allocated allowance exists upon receipt of the 
allocation, to be valued initially and subsequently at fair value. Also there has been a 
tentative decision to present the information on the financial statements using a linked 
presentation, where the asset and liability is presented in full but then totaled to present the 
net position. 
One of the future decisions to be made is in regard to the kind of asset an emission allowance 
will be classified as. This author believes that since emissions allowances, because of their 
many uses, are not easily classified into any existing asset classification, emissions 
allowances will become their own form of asset under the new standard. 
Another significant topic of debate amongst the emissions trading project team is the 
determination of the number of allowances to be returned at the end of the compliance 
period. Thought both the project staff and the board members are split on this issue, it is this 
Page 46 
author's opinion that in the case of excess emissions the liability should be recognized as 
emissions occur based on a pro-rata calculation. This would provide financial statement user 
more accurate information regarding the actual position of the entity. 
Currently the IASB/F ASB project team is soliciting comments from the stakeholders 
regarding their tentative decisions and the remaining decisions. Once this is complete an 
exposure draft is expected in the 41h quarter of 2011. There is some evidence to suggest that 
many emitters in the EU are not focused on the results of these project discussions. It is 
recommended that these emitters as well as auditors, and accounting experts work together to 
provide feedback in a clear and consistent manor to the project team in an effort to harmonize 
accounting practices. 
The accounting rules and principles decided as part of the emissions trading schemes project 
will have a potentially material influence on participant companies financial statements and 
as such will likely become an increasing source of conflict before the draft is finalized. 
Regardless of any decisions made by the IASB one thing is clear. Due to the use of such 
varying practices in industry, the IASB faces an up hill battle in wining international 
approval and adoption of the standard they create regardless of its content. 
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